Sasha

Negation case means here that we have predicate with negation. For example: A: Color of Buddha Amitayus is not white because it is red B: There is no pervasion (ma khyab) [i.e. not everything which is red is not white] A: There is pervasion (khyab pa yod par thal). White and red are mutually exclusive (‘ga ba).

Here we can see different relations between subject, predicate and reason in 2 cases: 1) Reason is not established (rtags ma grub) A: Sound is impermanent because it is made B: Reason is not established (rtags ma grub) [i.e. sound is not made] A: Sound is made because it is arisen from causes and conditions In "rtags ma grub" case we challenge the relations between subject and reason. Opponent says that reason is irrelevant to subject. In further debate we should put that reason to the place of predicate and have to find another reason. 2) No pervasion (ma khyab) A: Sound is impermanent because it is made B: There is no pervasion (ma khyab) [i.e. not everything which is made is impermanent] A: There is pervasion (khyab pa yod par thal). Impermanent and made are mutually inclusive - or synonymous (don gcig). In "ma khyab" case we challenge the relations between predicate and reason. Reason have to be either a subset of predicate or mutually inclusive with predicate, and in the case of negation reason and predicate should be mutually exclusive.

A : If something is round it is red. B: Color of white egg (chos can). It is red because it is round (yin par thal). You have to accept pervasion (khyab pa khas)? A: The reason is not established (ma grub) - it means you have to prove that "Color of white egg is round" ... B: Color of white egg (chos can) is white because it is is one with Color of White egg A: The reason is not established (ma grub) - it means you have to prove that "Color of white egg is one with Color of White egg"

Dinara, it’s not correct dispute. You can say for example: Someone says (kha cig na re). A : If something is round it has a color B: Transparent round crystal (chos can). It has a color because it is round(yin par thal). You have to accept pervasion(khyab pa khas). A: The reason is not established (ma grub) B: Transparent round crystal (chos can). It is round(yin par thal). Because transparent round crystal is one with itself(yin pai phyir). Then the debate should go as follows: B: If you agree with the root statement(rtsa bar ‘dod na)… you can train and write what is next J

Actually, that is the only way to avoid this contradiction

No, I mean, I understand this - Geshela also expressed this idea of mixed and non-mixed colors. But it is tricky. Because if we would follow the text we would not be able to find that colors of cloud are devided into 2 groups: only colors of clouds which are mixed colors and only colors of clouds which are non-mixed colors. If we would find this - okay, I agree. But according to the text - that doesn't follow. I think that's why Geshela stopped the debate and asked: what is your personal rang lug?

Actually, this i called "by public opinion": although public opinion of pretas represents it as pus(it performes a function of pus for them), it is not a pus in absolute sense, That's why this representation is not valid or invalid absolutely.

Well, then in the same logic it should be: if something is a member of white color it is not necessarily root color

So, also it can be 2 controversial valid inferential cognitions. For example on a subject: white color of a cloud. 1 - It is subset of a white color, because it is white 2 - It is subset of color of cloud, because it is color of cloud How do you prove what cognition is valid and what is not valid?

So, we have 2 controversial conclusions: I) White color of a cloud It is subset(or member) of a white color Because it is white II) White color of a cloud It is subset(or member) of color of cloud Because it is color of cloud Both are valid (it is to the question of validness)

When two minds perceive directly some object and one(public opinion) perceives it as a table and second as a chair – how do you prove the validness? By performing the functions? But in situation when this object performs function as a table for public and for the second mind it performs the functions of a chair?

Yes, higher schools do not accept the idea of the individed particles. I think it is because individed particles can be only in a situation when they have its self-nature(inherent existence)...

But if public opinion is not valid – it means that there is mind which is valid and contradicts the public opinion. How do you prove the validness of this second mind? Yes, but I’m focusing more on this narrow subject “validness” (the state or condition of being valid, or in a simple words - unmistaken answer to a question “how do we know that this is this and not that?”). “Imputation” is different subject. These 2 subjects have 4 possibilities: 1. smth which is valid and imputation: valid imputation 2. smth which is valid but not imputation: valid reason 3. smth whis is not valid but is a imputation: mistaken imputation 4. smth which is not valid and not a imputation: mistaken reason Jamgon-la, in fact that is not about 2 truths. It is about 1 ultimate truth. If smth exists by mere imputation – it cannot exist inherently. And if smth exists inherently – it cannot exist by mere imputation. It is controversial or mutually exclusive (‘gal ba). So, when we analyze how things exist ultimately we find that they exists by mere imputation. Completely agree on what you write about the 2 truths. I have focused slightly on a specific aspect – validness(unmistaken answer to a question “how do we know that this is this and not that?”). If there is a dependence on imputation, then question comes: what is the criteria of validness? How do you know that this imputation is valid and that imputation is not valid? As Boris write about valid imputation: there can't exist another valid mind which can contradict the imputation. So, only criteria of validness of imputation – absence of other valid mind which is in contradiction with 1st imputation. But in the situation when we have 2 minds with the opposite or controversial imputations - how do we define which is valid and which is not?

So, what Sautrantika following Reasoning tells about this?

So, then are you agree with the statement: there are only 2 possibilities to exist in absolute way(ultimately) – either smth exists from its own side(inherently or having its self-nature on its side) or smth exists according to imputation(i.e. according to people’s public opinion). Or there can be some 3rd variant? Existence of karma and existence of I – what is the difference? I exists by mere imputation, why karma cannot exists in the same mode?